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Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based
Compliance Strategy
Abstract
Canadians today are very much concerned about corporate crime and about corporations that do not comply
with regulatory requirements, especially those related to the environment, securities law and occupational
health and safety regulations. This increased concern has led to proposals to extend liability for illegal
corporate conduct (by making directors personally liable for the actions of their companies, for example); it
has also led to arguments in favour of greatly increasing the sanctions on corporations (and individual
wrongdoers within those corporations) for wrongful conduct. The recent academic literature reflects a lively
debate as to the effectiveness of such proposals in reducing illegal behaviour in corporations and their
consequences for the functioning of the corporation as an economic institution.
With some notable exceptions, the focus of the debate on sanctions and liability rules has resulted in the
relative neglect of an essential ingredient in effective deterrence; the capacity to monitor and detect
wrongdoing within the corporation. The lack of attention to the potential for increased compliance through
improved monitoring and detection is surprising for several reasons. First, as Jennifer Arlen notes, "[m]any
corporate crimes - such as securities fraud, government procurement fraud, and some environmental crimes
cannot be readily detected by government". Second, there is a significant body of literature on regulatory
reform that relates the ineffectiveness of many traditional "command and control" forms of regulation to the
costs and difficulties which are inherent in government monitoring and detection of wrongdoing. Third, one
of the most generally held tenets of contemporary criminology is that increasing the likelihood of detection
and prosecution tends to be a more effective means of strengthening deterrence than making sanctions more
severe. In other words, it is better to put another cop on the beat than to build more jail cells.
This study is intended to help redress the inadequate emphasis on monitoring and detection in the current
debate on corporate criminal and regulatory responsibility. Accepting the proposition that direct monitoring
of corporate conduct by government as a means of detection is unlikely to be cost-effective, our concern is to
identify agents within the corporation who can be enlisted in the cause of monitoring and detection, and to
consider how public policies can provide stronger incentives, and make it easier, for these agents to identify
and disclose wrongdoing within the corporation. In conducting this analysis, we begin by considering one
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INTRODUCTION
CANADIANS TODAY ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED about corporate crime andabout corporations that do not comply with regulatory requirements,
especially those related to the environment, securities law and occupational
health and safety regulations. This increased concern has led to proposals to
extend liability for illegal corporate condud (by making directors personally
liable for the actions of their companies, for example); it has also led to
arguments in favour of greatly increasing the sanctions on corporations (and
individual wrongdoers within those corporations) for wrongful conduct. The
recent academic literature reflects a lively debate as to the effectiveness of
such proposals in reducing illegal behaviour in corporations and their conse-
quences for the functioning of the corporation as an economic institution.2
With some notable exceptions,3 the focus of the debate on sanctions and
liability rules has resulted in the relative neglect of an essential ingredient in
effective deterrence; the capacity to monitor and detect wrongdoing within
the corporation. The lack of attention to the potential for increased compliance
through improved monitoring and detection is surprising for several reasons.
First, as Jennifer Arlen notes, "[m]any corporate crimes - such as securities
fraud, government procurement fraud, and some environmental crimes -
cannot be readily detected by government".4 Second, there is a significant
body of literature on regulatory reform that relates the ineffectiveness of
many traditional "command and control" forms of regulation to the costs
and difficulties which are inherent in government monitoring and detection
of wrongdoing.s Third, one of the most generally held tenets of contemporary
criminology is that increasing the likelihood of detection and prosecution
tends to be a more effective means of strengthening deterrence than making
sanctions more severe. In other words, it is better to put another cop on the
beat than to build more jail cells.6
This study is intended to help redress the inadequate emphasis on
monitoring and detection in the current debate on corporate criminal and
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regulatory responsibility. Accepting the proposition that direct monitoring of
corporate conduct by government as a means of detection is unlikely to be
cost-effective, our concern is to identify agents within the corporation who can
be enlisted in the cause of monitoring and detection,] and to consider how
public policies can provide stronger incentives, and make it easier, for these
agents to identify and disclose wrongdoing within the corporation. In
conducting this analysis, we begin by considering one such policy that has
generated sustained public attention and controversy over the last decade:
so-called "whistleblower protection."
Recognizing that agents within corporations (and government institutions)
risk retaliation in the form of dismissal if they disclose corporate wrongdoing,
many jurisdictions in North America have adopted legislation to protect
employee whistleblowers, either by providing them with a private right of
action when dismissed in retaliation for whistleblowing or through outright
prohibition of dismissal or other disciplinary measures motivated by retaliation.8
It is not, however, these modest protective provisions that have captivated the
public imagination, nor have these provisions contributed significantly to the
disclosure of spectacular corporate frauds. Rather, it is the offer (or prospect)
of substantial rewards or bounties to whistleblowers, most notably under the
False Claims Act, a federal u.s. statute (as amended in 1986), that has produced
this result.9 Under the provisions of this statute,1O an individuaPI who discovers
wrongdoing that has injured the U.S. federal government (fraud in defence
procurement, for example) may launch a private lawsuit against the corporate
wrongdoer. The government has the option to join the action or not, but the
individual may nevertheless proceed even if the government declines to do so.
If successful, the whistleblower may recover a bounty calculated to be between
25 percent and 30 percent of the total penalties or other damages assessed
against the wrongdoer. In cases where the Justice Department joins the action,
the minimum recovery is reduced to 15 percent. If unsuccessful, the whistle-
blower is responsible for her own legal costs but is not responsible for the legal
costs of the defendant except where the court is convinced that the action is
vexatious. The most spectacular whistleblower suits have centred on multi-
million dollar frauds, particularly in the areas of defense and health-care
procurement and have usually resulted in convictions. In these instances,
whistleblowers have often received what appear to be very large payoffs,
which, in effect, reflect the size of the scam uncovered and the enormous
savings to government.
Despite the arguable savings to the public from this type of action, under
the False Claims Act the practice of providing bounties to whistleblowers has
been controversial. First, there is the argument that much of the information
divulged through actions under the False Claims Act would have been divulged
even if much smaller bounties had been offered. Second, corporations are
vulnerable to false claims made by opportunistic whistleblowers who may be
motivated to force corporations into financial settlements in order to avoid
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the adverse reputational and related effects caused by highly public, albeit ill-
founded, accusations. Third, it is sometimes argued that rewards for external
whistleblowing frustrate efforts at internal compliance, or act as disincentives
to "internal" whistleblowing. For instance, an employee may be dissuaded
from reporting a misconduct in a timely fashion within the corporation
because of the prospect of receiving a large reward by disclosing corporate
wrongdoing through litigation, thereby undermining internal efforts at corporate
compliance (the importance of which is often stressed in a wide range of the
relevant policy and legal literature) .12 Fourth, it is often suggested that the
calibration of the amount of the reward from whistleblowing directly to the
amount of the penalty (and thereby to the degree of seriousness and extent of
the wrongdoing) provides whistleblowers with an incentive to report wrong-
doing later rather than earlier, and to do so only after the corruption has
produced much more serious consequences, rather than disclosing evidence of
corruption in the corporation immediately.
Finally, some analysts worry that the practice of rewarding whistleblowing
may have deleterious effects on trust and team spirit within corporations,
ingredients seen by many as critical to the success of corporations as economic
institutions. As is evident from the variety of pejorative colloquial expressions
for whistleblowing (ratting, squealing, tattling, etc.), reporting co-workers,
associates or superiors to the authorities often has negative moral connotations.
These connotations have been powerfully reinforced in our time by the frequent
use of "informers" by totalitarian regimes, both left and right, a practice often
closely identified with the repellent nature of those regimes.
This study draws primarily on analytical techniques and empirical studies
from the literature of the law, economics and organizational behaviour. Since
understanding the effects of rewarding whistleblowers depends on an under-
standing of their motivations and the effects of their actions on the essential
ethical life of the corporation (as a human association), it is our hope that this
study will also contribute to the more subtle and informed debate over the
morality of whistleblowing.
Do WE NEED MORE INCENTIVES?
THE OBVIOUS QUESTION IN THE DEBATE over whistleblowing is: Is there anyneed for new instruments that may be used to increase the probability of
detecting criminal or quasi-criminal conduct by corporations? If, as the
economics literature suggests, i.J penalties set for corporate wrongdoing are
based on the social consequences of the impugned behaviour divided by the
probability of detection, the total social costs of corporate regulation and
wrongdoing should be minimized - which consequently maximizes social
welfare. 14 According to this theory, any weakness in detection and prosecution
can be offset by increasing the weight of the penalty that is imposed. However,
in practice there are several impediments to this theory. As mentioned earlier,
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there is a growing awareness in the criminology literature that increasing the
magnitude of sanctions cannot easily compensate for low probabilities of
detection. Another factor that weighs against relying on added penalties as a
way of constraining corporate wrongdoing relates to the marginal deterrence
problem; that is, there is a tendency for optimal fines to become level across
different types of crimes, which reduces the incentive for wrongdoers to refrain
from engaging in more socially damaging forms of conduct. Further, to the
extent that financial penalties are relied on principally to enforce desired
forms of conduct, the efficacy of those penalties is contingent upon the financial
solvency of wrongdoers. Where fines exceed the assets of wrongdoers, then the
magnitude of the expected penalty is effectively capped, possibly at levels far
below what is socially optimal.
This problem is particularly acute in the case of corporations, where
shareholders, the nominal principals of the corporation, enjoy limited liability
(i.e., the amount of their financial exposure from corporate wrongdoing is
limited to the amount of funds that they have actually invested or committed
to have invested in the corporation). For shareholders, therefore, increasing
the magnitude of financial penalties above their existing wealth levels will
have only a limited effect on their behaviour, and therefore on the behaviour
of the corporation. IS However, there is some evidence to suggest that shareholders
are not generally the driving force behind corporate wrongdoing, at least within
widely held public corporations. 16 As Jennifer Arlen notes, "[c]orporate crimes
are not committed by corporations; they are committed by agents of the
corporation".17 Nevertheless, the limited liability of shareholders does inhibit
the deterrent effect of fines and penalties in that it reduces shareholders'
incentive to engage in active monitoring of the corporation's agents.
Moreover, while other investors (namely creditors) may suffer financial losses
in the event that the shareholders' equity is less than the magnitude of the
fine levied on the corporation for wrongdoing, contractual and legal restrictions
limit the scope for creditor voice. IH In this vein, Polinsky & Shavell (1993)
have argued that the difficulties in raising fines to the levels necessary to create
optimal penalties provide a rationale for relying on state sanctions for wrong-
doing, particularly imprisonment of individual corporate actors.19 Nevertheless,
while imprisonment may be effective for some types of corporate wrongdoing,
its utility is impaired by endemic information problems which make it difficult
for the state to identify the corporate agents responsible for wrongful corporate
conduct. zo
If increasing the magnitude of the penalty is not an effective way to
constrain corporate wrongdoing, then why not rely on state monitoring to
increase the probability of detection, thereby securing optimal levels of corporate
compliance? An overriding consideration militating against reliance on external
monitoring is, of course, the strained fiscal resources of the public sector.21
Since the beginning of the post-war period, as the breadth and intensity of
public demands upon governments in industrialized democracies have
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increased, so too has their inability to generate the revenues necessary to fund
new programs, even where it is clear that the new programs can yield greater
social benefits than those generated by existing programmes. In the case of
marginal investments in monitoring-related activities, the lack of demonstrable
showcase effects emanating from such expenditures, combined with the existence
of stable and powerful coalitions in favour of existing programmes, undercuts
the ease with which public officials can re-direct scarce public resources to
allegedly more valuable activities, such as increased monitoring to ensure
corporate compliance with public goals.
The inability of the public sector to muster or re-direct resources to
monitoring, however, is only part of the reason why additional expenditures
are not made. The comparative inefficiency of public versus private monitoring
mechanisms is also implicated. First, in contrast to external public monitors,
private actors within the corporation can gain access to real-time, on-the-spot
information with fewer additional resources. To coordinate internal corporate
activity, shareholders (or their managerial representatives) make fixed
investments in internal information and control systems which can also be
used to acquire, transmit and analyze information respecting corporate
compliance decisions, thereby exploiting economies of scope. In contrast,
external government monitors may have difficulty accessing firm information
systems, and may therefore have to invest in duplicative (and perhaps more
costly) information systems.
Second, while duplicative investments in monitoring can be avoided to
some extent by having government concentrate its efforts on auditing rather
than on continuous monitoring, the reliability of information gleaned from
such activity is very low. Firms can easily manipulate the data culled by
government authorities, thereby conveying a more favourable impression of
their compliance effort than is accurate. Alternatively, even in the absence of
a deliberate attempt to "cook the books", the information obtained by govern-
ment auditors may be unreliable due to stochastic variances in the way a
corporation's production functions. For instance, government environmental
monitors could inadvertently sample the emissions discharged by a corporate
polluter during periods when the level of regulated emissions was unusually low.
Even if government did have the technological capability to gather raw
information regarding the incidence of wrongful corporate conduct, it often
encounters significant barriers in being able to interpret and analyze these data
against firm and industry practices. In part, this impediment is a function of
public-sector compensation constraints, which weaken the attraction of
government service to highly qualified industry specialists. In part, it is also a
function of the difficulties that any industry outsider confronts in understanding
I and assessing the effects of novel corporate practices in a setting of rapid and~
, profound organizational and technological change. Regulation of financialI markets is a case in point; the ingenuity and contrivances of unscrupulouslm"kot acto" typically auWtip th, analytical cxpeni,e af gavemrn::
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inspectors and compliance officers, with the result that wrongdoing is often
effectively hidden from public regulatory authorities.zz
Even if public authorities were able to generate optimal levels of enterprise
liability for corporations without having to rely on excessive financial penalties,
a great many daunting compliance problems would be raised by internal agency
conflicts. Commencing with Berle & Means (1932), numerous scholars of
corporate behaviour have focused on the issue of accountability in the modern
corporation, particularly with respect to the responsibilities of managers to
shareholders. I] The concern is that management will exploit the delegation of
power it receives from shareholders to advance its own interests. Subsequently,
law and economics scholars have formalized and generalized these account-
ability problems through the use of agency analysis. The analysis focuses on
the accountability problems that arise in the modem corporation when principals
delegate power to agents in the absence of perfect information.Z4 In the context
of corporate wrongdoing, the concern is that managers will ignore the share-
holders' direction to comply with legislated responsibilities because of the
private benefits they realize from engaging in sanctioned behaviour, namely
increases in compensation or other perquisites. For instance, by chiselling or
scrimping on the expenditures required to be made pursuant to various types
of regulatory compliance programs (e.g., environmental or occupational
health and safety), managers may be able to increase the level of reported
earnings, which, assuming the existence of incentive-based compensation
arrangements, will result in their receiving increased compensation. Although
there is the risk that the misconduct will be detected and punished by the
state (With losses imposed on shareholders), the existence of substantial lags
between misconduct and detection, difficulties in determining levels of personal
responsibility for culpable conduct within the organization, and problems of
collective action that undermine the ability of shareholders to discipline
managerial misconduct, all combine to reduce the likelihood that wrongdoing
will result in sanctions (including job losses) for senior managers. Of course, to
the extent that managers are risk-averse because of their high levels of firm-
specific human capital investment, this propensity may undercut the willingness
of managers to engage in wrongdoing that entails the threat of job loss.
So far, we have focused on the agency problems that exist between
shareholders and senior managers. However, as the organizational behaviour
literature demonstrates, issues of accountability are not confined to senior levels
of the corporation; these problems are also inherent in the relationships that
exist among senior-, mid- and lower-level employees. For instance, lower-level
management may pursue goals that conflict with those set out by senior
managers because the private gains from deviation more than offset the
accompanying costs. These internal agency problems (often referred to as
"sub-goal pursuits") are also manifested in distorted information flows from
lower-level managers to senior managers (often expressed as "information
impactedness"). The net effect is to hobble the capacity of senior management
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to implement and operate an effective compliance regime. /1 These problems
are undoubtedly exacerbated by "collective folly", the documented tendency
of groups to engage in excessive forms of risk-taking (compared to the levels of
risk that individuals would be willing to assume). Thus, to the extent that
middle- and lower-level management coalesce as a group, they may be willing
to run greater risks, even of job loss, in failing to adhere to firm-mandated
compliance strategies.
In combination, the factors enumerated suggest the need for additional
instruments to align corporate and social interests in ensuring responsible
corporate conduct. In the next section, we consider the role for one such
instrument - whistleblowing - in fostering this alignment.
THE CASE FOR WHISTLEBLOWING
THE CASE FOR WHISTLEBLOWING AS AN INSTRUMENT of corporate controlrests on its ability to induce corporate actors with local knowledge of
corporate misconduct to report that information in real time to internal and
external monitors. Essentially, rewards for whistleblowing seek to destabilize
coalitions within the firm that are committed to conspiring against the
public weal by enhancing the attraction of personal defection strategies.
Whistleblowing inducements are also attractive for their ability to exploit
existing internal information systems. As mentioned earlier, in contrast to
external monitoring mechanisms, whistleblowing draws on the benefits of
sunk investment costs in existing internal management and information
systems. Against these benefits, however, there are certain costs.
First, the existence of whistleblowing inducements may distort optimal
information flows and decision-making structures within the corporation. To
the extent that senior managers are committed to wrongdoing and lack the
confidence that lower-level employees will support their activities by keeping
quiet, they can be expected to recast organizational routines and decision-
making systems in order to limit the access of potential "employee-defectors"
to information that indicates or suggests any wrongdoing. Obviously, if
decision-making and information systems for compliance are also used to
coordinate firm production, the distortion of these systems to support
managerial misconduct can be expected to inflict significant costs on the
productive efficiency of the firm. This concern is especially relevant given
the growing premium that the organizational literature places on the benefits
derived from decentralized decision-making in securing firm-competitive
advantage.
A second and related point is that whistleblowing may cause senior
managers to make lower-level employees over-invest in firm- or industry-
specific human capital in order to magnify the downside costs of whistleblowing.
High levels of firm- or industry-specific human capital, particularly when the
costs of such investment are borne principally by employees in return for
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future compensation, increase the vulnerability of employees to retaliation by
the firm for whistleblowing, particularly through job displacement.
A third concern has to do with the effect of whistleblowing on firm
culture and teamwork. Some analysts claim that by creating strong individual
incentives for defection from perverse corporate policies, whistleblowing subverts
the ability of managers to create durable commitments to firm culture and
teamwork. However, it is important to avoid overstating the importance of
this concern. Whistleblowing incentives will not undermine a corporate
culture that is based on honesty and fair play; rather, it will jeopardize only
those cultures that are based on a perverse commitment to conspire against
the public weal.
Whistleblower awards of the magnitude frequently seen over the last
decade in the United States are unquestionably costly. Like other government
payments intended to influence conduct (such as subsidies to businesses), an
obvious question is whether the cost of these payments is justified in terms of
its ability to procure benefits by altering the conduct of the recipient. There is
the possibility that much of the action taken by the whistleblower might occur
even without a payment or with a lesser inducement. Perhaps an appropriate
starting point for investigating the costs and benefits of whistleblower awards
is to examine the "base-line" of human conduct upon which the awards operate.
That is to say, apart from whistleblowing awards, what are the incentives that
operate upon individuals, particularly upon actors within the corporation, to
report wrongdoing? What are the disincentives?
One major factor that probably influences reporting of corporate mis-
conduct is a sense of public duty or responsibility, and the satisfaction that
comes from performing that duty.16 There are cases, as well, where the
corporation's wrongdoing exposes whistleblowers, their friends and/or their
families to risks that may constitute genuine hazards (for example, hazards
created by non-compliance with regulations relating to occupational health
and safety, nuclear and aviation safety, etc.). Such risks provide employees
with a powerful incentive to engage in whistleblowing. Third, continual
serious wrongdoing may have disastrous reputational effects on the corporation
and its management. This can lead to the corporation's economic decline,
which in turn can result in greater risk of employee job loss or, in the case of
senior management, a decline in the value of their stock in the corporation or
other performance-related compensation. Fourth, in some corporations, senior
management may actually reward employees who report wrongdoing where
this leads to avoidance of liability, or reduced liability for the corporation
itselfY Finally, in some instances, the opportunity to neutralize one's rivals or
punish one's enemies within the corporation may provide a motivation for
whistleblowing.
The most powerful disincentives to whistleblowing derive from the
prospect of retaliation by fellow employees or by the corporation itself, including
dismissal of the whistleblower. 18 Other disincentives include the fear that
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detection of wrongful conduct will harm the corporation, thereby increasing
the risk that the employee will lose her job or that her own reputation will be
tarnished by association with the corporation when the wrongdoing is
exposed.
Given the range of incentives to whistleblowing identified above, one
might expect a high rate of whistleblowing to be achieved merely by removing
the principal disincentive - the fear of retaliation. However, existing statutory
protection for whistleblowers (statutes that allow whistleblowers to sue for
wrongful dismissal or which otherwise deter retaliatory conduct) has serious
limitations. In the first place, most whistleblower-protection statutes do not
provide remedies for retaliatory actions that fall short of dismissal - such as
demotions, unwanted geographical transfers, failure to consider an employee
for promotion, freezing an employee out of a decision-making role consonant
with level of seniority, inordinate scrutiny and surveillance in and outside the
workplace, and psychological pressures. 29
Of course, individually and/or cumulatively, some of these acts might be
regarded as "constructive dismissal". However, even assuming a creative
application of the constructive dismissal doctrine, and allowing for statutory
protections that extend to forms of discipline or revenge that stop short of
dismissal, serious evidentiary and interpretative obstacles exist in judicial or
regulatory surveillance of employer treatment of an employee ex post an act of
whistleblowing. In some instances, action taken by the employer that an
employee attributes to revenge may have legitimate corporate purposes, or it
may be cloaked under legitimate corporate purposes. A presumption that any
ex post treatment of an employee that is sub-optimal from the perspective of
that employee's interests constitutes retaliation would risk constraining other-
wise efficient business decisions. Conversely, placing too great a burden of
proof on the employee to show a retaliatory intent could easily lead to
under-sanctioning retaliatory acts that can be more-or-Iess masked as normal
personnel policies. Even assuming that the right balance could be struck, in
most instances, deterring the more subtle forms of retaliation would involve
on-going judicial scrutiny of micro-decisions within corporations - at a
considerable cost to the whistleblower, the corporation, and the public
purse.
Even where a whistleblower can ultimately exit the firm with a wrongful
dismissal settlement, the reputational effects of having blown the whistle may
harm the whistleblower's prospects of re-employment elsewhere in the same
industry or community. (However, depending on how other employers view
the wrongful conduct disclosed, they might welcome a whistleblower; but this
is not a prospect a potential whistleblower can count on.) Glazer & Migdal
studied the fates of some 41 whistleblowers whom they characterized as ethical
resisters. Of the 41, 28 (68.3 percent) had difficulty finding employment
after blowing the whistle and, of the 28, 18 had to settle for employment in
"fields unrelated to their previous work". JO
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Common law and statutory protection against retaliation insulates
whistleblowers and their families even less effectively from the severe psycho-
logical pressures that come from standing up to the corporation.
Whistleblowers must be prepared to have their personal backgrounds investigated,
to have their charges challenged as lies, to lose the support of fellow-employees,
and to be accused of threatening jobs and prosperity in the firm and perhaps in
the broader community. In some circumstances, whistleblowers may even risk
physical harm. Of course, where whistleblowers are able to survive (psycho-
logically and physically) until the corporation or the wrongdoers within the
corporation are brought to justice, they may become heroes - compensating
for their earlier vilification. However, whistleblowers must also face the risk
that the information they divulge, however persuasive, may not be sufficient to
sustain a criminal conviction, in which case the corporation may well be
vindicated in the eyes of colleagues and the community. Thus, if it is unlikely
that the legal protection of whistleblowers against retaliation is sufficient to
redress the imbalance between the disincentives and incentives for whistle-
blowing, there is a plausible prima facie case that additional incentives are
needed to achieve a socially optimal level of whistleblowing. This appears to
be supported by anecdotal evidence that the 1986 changes in the False Claims
Act elicited responses and brought forth information about fraudulent practices
that might have been, but was not, reported before the legislation offered
substantial rewards to whistleblowers. J1
ISSUES IN CALCULATING INCENTIVES TO
WHISTLEBLOWERS
U NDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S REWARD is calculatedas a percentage of the total penalties and other damages assessed against
the corporation. It has been argued that this method of determining the
amount of the reward creates perverse incentives for whistleblowers to with-
hold information or to come forward significantly later than when they first
suspect wrongdoing (on the assumption that the longer the wrongdoing
continues, the more serious it will become and the larger the ultimate
reward will be). In the well-known case of United States et al. v. General
Electric,J2 the U.S. Justice Department sought to have the Court reduce the
award to the whistleblower, Chester Walsh, from $14.9 million to $4.5 million,
on the grounds that Walsh and his lawyers could have avoided loss to the
United States by reporting the wrongdoing in question immediately after it
first came to Walsh's attention. The Court, however, accepted Walsh's claim
that much of the delay was justified by the difficulty of obtaining sufficient
evidence of wrongdoing without undue risk to his own security. It therefore
reduced Walsh's reward only by a small amount, from 25 percent to 22.5 per-
cent. The Justice Department initially sought to appeal the decision but
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eventually settled with Walsh for $11.5 million, a reduction from the $13.4
million ordered by the Court.
The ability of a whistleblower under the False Claims Act to increase the
amount of a reward through delay in the reporting of wrongdoing seems like
an obvious moral hazard problem. However, there are good reasons to favour
the Court's cautious approach in addressing this problem in the General
Electric case. Encouraging immediate or precipitous reporting of wrongdoing
may have undesirable effects, given the characteristics of whistleblowers and
of the situations they face. First, whistleblowers are likely to be persons who
have a strong sense of loyalty to the corporation as a whole. J3 Confronted with
the initial evidence of wrongdoing, their immediate reaction may well be
disbelief. if whistleblower awards are tied to immediate reporting, such
individuals may well not come forward at all since they will be disinclined to
jump quickly to a conclusion that an organization for which they have a long-
standing respect is guilty of major wrongdoing. Second, the empirical evidence
suggests that employees are more likely to consider whistleblowing as justified
in instances of clearly illegal, serious misconduct than where it appears that
the conduct in question in merely unethical. J4 This suggests that if, in order to
obtain an award that provides sufficient compensation for the risk of retaliation,
it is necessary to act before one has been able to determine unambiguously
that serious wrongful conduct is occurring, some individuals will simply not
feel prepared to come forward.
This leads to a related point. In order to recover an award, the whistle-
blower must obtain a conviction of the wrongdoer in court. The whistleblower
bears the risk that a court will find insufficient evidence of wrongdoing, thereby
saddling the whistleblower with legal costs in addition to all of the harmful
reputational effects that may result from having blown the whistle (apparently)
unjustifiably. For this reason, whistleblowers may be unlikely to come forward
before they have assembled a body of evidence that makes a conviction all but
certain. This will often occur considerably later than the first suspicions of
wrongdoing given that the whistleblower may be required to assemble evidence
surreptitiously, often at considerable personal risk. This is reinforced by the
fact that the whistleblower will not know ex ante of blowing the whistle
whether the Justice Department will join the action with its investigatory
resources or whether the whistleblower herself will have to bear all of the
responsibility for assembling the evidentiary record. Furthermore, while earlier
whistleblowing may in some instances avert further wrongdoing, in other
circumstances it may provide the opportunity for wrongdoers to conceal or
destroy evidence of more serious wrongdoing.
In addition to these legitimate reasons for delayed reporting, it is also
important to recall that a purely opportunistic strategy of delaying the reporting
of wrongdoing in order to obtain a larger reward is not without serious risks to
the interests of the whistleblower. The longer the whistleblower delays taking
any action, the higher the risk that another whistleblower will come forward
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to relate information of the wrongdoing and capture all or part of the reward.
Moreover, delay may result in evidence being destroyed or rendered unavail-
able or unuseable, either intentionally or inadvertently. Computer tapes may
be erased, potential witnesses may die or be assigned overseas, and so forth.
The existence of these risks inherent in delay impose an intrinsic curb on
whistleblower opportunism.
The implications of this analysis are that, while it may be appropriate to
allow courts some discretion to reduce a reward where purely opportunistic or
inexplicable delay in relating information has occurred, the requirement to
report wrongdoing immediately should not be a condition for recovering a
substantial reward.
Another important implication has to do with the nature of the finan-
cial bounty provided to whistleblowers and the clash between compensation
and deterrence objectives entailed thereby. Given that the rewards to whistle-
blowers offered under the False Claims Act are based on a percentage of the
penalties ultimately assessed against the corporation, the bounty is generally
understood as giving expression to deterrence goals; the corporation is not
expected to compensate whistleblowers in excess of the fines prescribed by
optimal penalties. Nevertheless, it is clear that using a percentage of the fines
ultimate! y levied against the corporation as a basis for bounties paid to
whistleblowers may cause payments to diverge systematically from the levels
necessary to compensate whistleblowers for the risk of loss to their human capital
from corporate reraliation. In some cases, the specified percentage of the fine
levied against the corporation will undercompensate whistleblowers, while in
other cases, it will have the opposite effect. From an economic perspective,
under-compensation is more vexing because a prospective whistleblower who
determines ex ante that the bounty will not be sufficiently large to compensate
for the risk to her human capital will refrain from whistleblowing. Over-
compensation is less of a problem as it merely constitutes a windfall transfer
from the corporation to the whistleblower, which should not affect actual
behaviour. 35 For these reasons, it may make more sense to consider the
adoption of a minimum floor for whistleblowing bounties. This would ensure
that a whistleblower always obtains sufficient compensation to cover the risks
to her human capital.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING:
CONFLICTS OR COMPLEMENTS?
A MAJOR STRAND IN THE FABRIC of contemporary scholarship about regulationand corporate responsibility suggests the desirability of encouraging
internal mechanisms of self-regulation and self-monitoring within the
corporation.36 It is sometimes claimed by corporations that providing substantial
rewards to external whistleblowers frustrates efforts to create such internal
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mechanisms. If an employee can collect millions of dollars by reporting
wrongdoing externally, why would she wish to report internally in the first
instance ?J7 Based on this logic, a plausible case can be made that an employee
should have to attempt to deal with the problem internally before she can
bring an (external) lawsuit for the reason that it does involve a potential
reward for whistleblowing.38
A closer examination of the relationship between external and internal
whistleblowing, however, puts in doubt whether such a requirement would
produce desirable results. First, recent studies of employee attitudes toward
whistleblowing suggest that, generally, employees are inclined to report wrong-
doing internally before reporting such information to authorities outside the
firm as long as they do not fear retaliation from internal whistleblowing.39 Second,
employees may justifiably be afraid that internal whistleblowing mechanisms
(such as supposedly anonymous "hotlines") will be abused to identify trouble-
makers, and may allow wrongdoers the opportunity to destroy, conceal or
tamper with evidence or intimidate potential witnesses by tipping them off
that wrongdoing has been discovered.40 Even where shareholders, directors, or
senior management are strongly committed to positive internal disclosure
policies, employees may still fear retaliation from immediate supervisors or
middle managers. As Near & Miceli conclude, an organizational strategy to
"encourage valid [internal] whistle blowing may be difficult to implement even
if accepted by top managers. The weak link in such a strategy appears to be
the immediate supervisors and managers who retaliate against the whistle
blower, seemingly at will".41 These findings are consistent with the application
of the theory of agency costs to corporate wrongdoing, which suggests that the
interests of shareholders, senior managers, and other stakeholders within the
corporation may diverge significantly with respect to corporate wrongdoingY
If, as argued, a requirement of prior internal disclosure acts as a disincentive
to external whistleblowing, then it may, in turn, actually operate as a disin-
centive to corporations that adopt internal disclosure policies to protect workers
against retaliation for - and thereby encourage - internal whistleblowing. The
fear of being exposed to prosecution as a consequence of external whistleblowing
may be an important incentive for some corporations to adopt credible internal
disclosure policies and procedures. Such policies might very well gain employee
trust and increase the number of internal disclosures. 43
While we do not believe that weakening incentives for external whistle-
blowing is likely to increase incentives for internal whistleblowing (in fact, we
would expect the contrary to be true), it is also important that an external
whistleblower not be disadvantaged in recovering a reward by virtue of having
pursued internal channels before engaging in external whistleblowing. The
fact that delay in relating information may be due to the employee's efforts to
seek a solution to the problem within the corporation is an additional reason




A rather different concern about the relationship between internal and
external whistleblowing is that internal whistleblowing (even where it does
not result in retaliation, destruction of evidence etc.) may produce an outcome
that is not favourable to the public interest. First, internal whistleblowing may
afford the corporation or specific corporate actors an opportunity to pay hush
money to an internal whistleblower. Second, even where the corporation
takes steps to avoid future wrongdoing, it may be disinclined to inform the
authorities of past wrongdoing because of the prospect of having to pay sub-
stantial penalties. This problem is particularly acute in the case of corporate
fraud, where keeping the matter within the corporation may well lead to the
government foregoing recovery of substantial past losses. Again, since whistle-
blowers tend to be conservative individuals with strong loyalty to the corporation,
they may well be satisfied by an outcome that prevents future wrongdoing and
entails internal discipline of past wrongdoers.
WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLICITY IN
CORPORATE WRONGDOING
A SPECIAL DIFFICULTY IS APPARENT when a whistleblower is involved in thewrongdoing she has reported, either through complicity or through active
initiative. At the crudest level, the prospect of obtaining a large reward for
reporting wrongdoing in which one is involved may actually encourage mis-
conduct. Moreover, since obtaining a reward obviously depends upon other
employees also being involved in the wrongdoing, there may be an incentive
to corrupt other employees. Finally, since the reward is determined as a percentage
of the total penalties assessed against the corporation, a wrongdoer-
whistleblower has an incentive to increase the amount of wrongdoing by
other employees as much as possible. (Increasing her own wrongdoing may, of
course, lead to a larger award but it could also lead to larger criminal sanctions
against the whistleblower, thereby mitigating the effect of the former).
While these considerations appear to militate in favour of a hard-and-
fast rule that a whistleblower should not be entitled to a reward for reporting
wrongdoing to which she is a party, other factors may weigh against such a
rule. For example, in some cases insiders are likely to be the only plausible
whistleblowers or the only individuals with access to the kind of evidence
likely to secure a conviction. It is well-known that, in the context of organized
crime, successful prosecutions have often depended on inducing members of a
conspiracy, criminal organization or ring to "turn state's evidence".
Similarly, under a rule that largely eliminates the incentive to whistleblow
where the erstwhile whistleblower is herself implicated in wrongdoing, the
"leaders" of crime within the corporation have a strong incentive to induce
other employees to engage in wrongdoing so as to immunize them against
becoming whistleblowers - an incentive which, of course, is mitigated by the
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risk that the employees will refuse and, now alerted to the wrongdoing, will
blow the whistle before becoming implicated.
A related concern is that some employees who become involved in
wrongdoing may do so under pressure from managers or co-workers, or under
threat of retaliation. These employees are excellent candidates for whistle-
blowing. Too weak to do the right thing on principle but not inherently corrupt,
they may well be induced to whistleblow by the prospect of a reward that
mitigates the risks of doing so. It would seem perverse, then, to exclude this
class of individuals from eligibility for a whistleblowing reward. Nonetheless, it
can be argued that the prospect of such a reward in the first instance should
have been sufficient to induce such persons to whistleblow when pressure was
first put on them to engage in wrongful activity. However, when they first
succumb to such pressure these individuals may not yet be aware of the
seriousness or extent of wrongdoing. They may, for instance, think that they
are only being asked to cheat a little "around the edges", to help out a colleague or
the corporation or, alternatively, they may not (yet) have access to the kind of
evidence required to be confident of securing a conviction and therefore
obtaining a reward.
These considerations suggest that it would be undesirable to have a hard-
and-fast rule preventing an individual who is implicated in wrongdoing from
recovering a whistleblowing reward. Arguably, the best approach is to provide
the court with discretion to examine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
nature of the individual's wrongdoing in the circumstances justifies a reduction
or elimination of the award. Here, relevant factors will include whether the
individual has been a "leader" or a "follower" in the wrongdoing, whether she
became involved under pressure from co-workers or supervisors, at what point
she could have been expected to identify a clear pattern of serious wrongful
activity, and the extent to which she profited from wrongful activity before
blowing the whistle.
This suggests that the existing approach of the False Claims Act is not off
the mark. The Act allows the court to reduce an award where the action is
brought by an individual who herself has been involved in wrongdoing, but
only where the whistleblower has "planned and initiated" the wrongful
conduct. Furthermore, even in the case of an action by a whistleblower who
planned or initiated the wrongdoing, recovery is not barred altogether and the
reduction is not required by the statute, but rather isa matter for the discretion
of the judge, depending on the circumstances. This is somewhat offset, however,
by the proviso that a whistleblower who receives a criminal conviction for the
wrongful conduct that is the basis for the action shall be barred altogether
from recovery. This means that for the incentive of a reward to operate on a
whistleblower who herself is implicated in the wrongdoing, the whistleblower
might have to be assured of immunity from criminal prosecution.
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THE RISK OF FABRICATED CLAIMS
A s CALLAHAN & DWORKIN (1992) NOTE,44 it is often claimed that theprospect of large awards to whistleblowers provides an incentive for
employees to fabricate claims of wrongdoing for personal profit. If this were
true, one would anticipate that serious costs would follow, including harm to
the corporation's reputation and that of individual employees, wasted time and
money in defending against false claims, and a deterioration of morale within
the corporation. However, as Callahan & Dworkin further note,45 there are
several features of the False Claims Act that make fabricating claims of wrong-
doing a very high-risk strategy. First, the whistleblower must either convince
the Justice Department to pursue an action against the corporation or bear the
costs of the action herself. In the latter case, this involves either significant
out-of-pocket legal and investigatory expenses or persuading a lawyer that the
chances of success are sufficient to merit investing time on a contingency-fee
basis. Second, if the court determines that the action "was clearly frivolous,
clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment",46 the
whistleblower may be required to pay the corporation's costs. A more serious
risk is that a fabricated or exaggerated claim may be used by a whistleblower to
obtain a settlement from the corporation. This risk is probably greatest in the
case of a disgruntled employee who already doubts her future within the
corporation, or where the potential settlement is sufficiently large to outweigh
possible dismissal and other retaliation for such conduct. (This is also the risk
that the reputational effects attached to such behaviour may lead to "blacklisting"
by other potential employers).
At one level, one might ask why a corporation (usually a "deep-pocket"
litigant) would be prepared to settle a meritless claim for a substantial amount
of money. It is possible to imagine a scenario where even unfounded allegations
of corruption could effect a decline in the value of a corporation's shares.
Unproven allegations could, perhaps, also dissuade governments from entering
into new contracts with a corporation until the matter is "cleared up". A
fraudulent whistleblower could time her demand for a settlement strategically;
for example, at a time when the corporation is on the verge of winning a
major contract, is about to float a new equity issue, is about to be acquired, or
is about to undertake a merger.
The main difficulty facing the fraudulent whistleblower in these circum-
stances is that a large settlement of the whistleblower's claim is unlikely to
save the corporation's reputation. Shareholders and others may well infer from
such a settlement that wrongdoing has in fact occurred. It is true that the
corporation might be able to keep a settlement secret for a time, but eventually
a large disbursement must be reflected in the corporation's books and some-
how accounted for in its regular reporting to shareholders. Nevertheless, a
settlement might have the short-term value of pulling the corporation through
a critical period. In some circumstances, it might also be possible to disguise a
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settlement as a generous "golden handshake". Furthermore, if agency theory is
introduced into the analysis, even where it is not in the corporation's best interests
to settle with the whistleblower, individual employees or managers may be quite
happy to spend the corporation's money to silence a troublemaker, particularly
where the whistleblower's allegations impugn their personal reputations.
These considerations qualify the claim of Callahan & Dworkin that
"settlement leverage to be gained from a meritless claim is minimal".47
However, it is important to recognize that this leverage has little to do with
the availability of an award if the whistleblower has the option of being able
to succeed with the claim in court. Rather, it has everything to do with the
ability to do reputational harm to the corporation and/or its managers and
employees before the claim can be judicially scrutinized. The likelihood that a
corporation would settle, not because of this immediate threat but because of
the risk that a court might actually accept a truly fraudulent or fabricated
claim is probably minimal.
A related concern is that of Vigilantism. In the hope of gaining a large
reward if they actually uncover wrongdoing, employees may invest inefficient
amounts of time and resources in attempting to detect wrongdoing. This
would likely occur where at least some of the time and resources expended are
corporate, for which the individual employee does not bear the full opportunity
cost. Moreover, vigilantism may have subtle negative effects on corporate
interests where, for example, potential whistleblowers break into confidential
files or spy on other employees in the hope of uncovering wrongdoing. It is
important to note that it is not a requirement of the False Claims Act that a
whistleblower obtain information about wrongdoing either inadvertently or in
the normal course of her duties. Conversely, vigilante-like conduct, particularly
where no wrongdoing exists, can be legitimately and effectively disciplined
within the workplace - ultimately by dismissal if necessary. Intuitively, it is
unlikely that a potential whistleblower would run such risks unless she already
had plausible evidence of misconduct. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, a
disgruntled employee facing termination for other reasons might decide there
is little to lose in such behaviour.
While it might prevent some inefficient employee investments of company
time and resources in detecting wrongdoing, a rule preventing recovery where
the informer has not obtained information in the course of her normal duties
might also deter some efficient investments. Moreover, even if she discovers
some hint of wrongdoing in the normal course of her duties, it will often be
unlikely that she can gather decisive evidence of wrongdoing except through
active efforts. In fact, in many circumstances, using company time and
resources to gather evidence may be inevitable. Finally, given that whistle-
blowers typically consider themselves to be acting out of loyalty to the
corporation, they will be most inclined to make investments of corporate time
and resources in uncovering wrongdoing where they believe that doing so is in
the best interests of the corporation.
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GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: THE CASE FOR A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A DISTINCTIVE ASPECT OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER provisions of the False Claims
.l"'\.Aet is that they allow the whistleblower to pursue a private right of action
where the Justice Department refuses to take up the claim. A much higher
minimum level of award is provided to the whistleblower, where she pursues an
action on her own (25 percent as compared to 15 percent). This seems
reasonable, given the greater costs and risks of a whistleblower bearing the
carriage of the action. However, it is sometimes argued that allowing a private
right of action invites frivolous claims, which would otherwise be screened out
by public prosecutors.
In fact, as noted by Callahan & Dworkin, of the nearly 300 claims filed
between 1986 and 1992, only 42 were joined by the Justice Department.48 At
first glance it may seem odd that it could be socially efficient for a private
individual to pursue a whistleblower action but it is not socially efficient for
the Justice Department to do so. Callahan & Dworkin suggest that the govern-
ment may actually be saving money by allowing private individuals to bring
actions. However, any such savings are likely outweighed by the higher payment
generally owed to a whistleblower in compensation for having brought the
action (unless we assume that whistleblowers are able to use legal resources
more efficiently than the government, which may very well be the case). This
may also be partly explained by the departmental budgets which put ceilings
on internal resources for investigation and prosecution and which cannot easily
be raised in the short term. Under these circumstances, it can be predicted
that Justice Department lawyers will decline to prosecute even where it is
socially efficient to do so if the anticipated benefit is outweighed by the
opportunity cost of foregoing prosecution of a more promising claim. If there
were no fixed limits on prosecutorial resources, the Justice Department would
pursue every action where the marginal social benefit49 of doing so is equal to
the marginal cost in prosecutorial resources and where the marginal cost of
prosecutorial resources that are equal in effectiveness to those that would be
marshalled by the whistleblower herself is less than the cost to the government of
the whistleblower pursuing her own action (i.e., where a higher percentage of
the total recovery goes to the whistleblower to reflect her carriage of the
action, with a corresponding smaller recovery for the public purse).
If we introduce assumptions related to public choice, the government's
decision whether to prosecute or not may not be determined solely by
considerations of maximizing social welfare or the public interest. The govem-
ment's decision will also be influenced by agency theory assumptions that the
decisions of bureaucrats regarding individual prosecutions will be affected by
their own interests and not only the government's (whether the latter is defined
in terms of public interest or public choice). Moreover, the availability of a
private right of action may have much broader consequences than the above
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account suggests. From a public choice standpoint, the government may be
reluctant to prosecute a corporation that wields influence on government
generally and to which it is indebted for, or from which it expects to receive,
political contributions. A government may also be reluctant to prosecute
where an investigation and trial could reveal government complicity in
corporate wrongdoing.
The possibility of the government failing to prosecute wrongdoing for
such reasons reinforces the value of a private right of action as a means of
"guarding the guardians". The potential for using whistleblower legislation in
this way is important to bear in mind when considering some of the specific
issues in design and interpretation of whistleblower provisions in the False
Claims Act. First, the possibility that a government may not prosecute in order
to conceal its own complicity with wrongdoing suggests that governmental
complicity should not act as a bar or a kind of estoppel defence against an
action whose carriage is born by the whistleblower herself. This supports the
result in the case of Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, where the
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that awareness by
government officials of the falsity of a contractual claim did not provide a
valid defence to a whistleblower suit against the contractor. 50
A more subtle issue in the design of an optimal whistleblower statute is
also raised by the facts of this case. The legislative history of the False Claims
Act, reviewed by the Court in Hagood, suggests a preoccupation with designing
statutory provisions which do not require that the government forego significant
revenue to compensate a whistleblower for information already available to
the government. The assumption is that it is inefficient to pay for something
that one already owns. However, it is precisely when the government is in
complicity with the wrongdoing that the information, by definition, will
already have been available to it. The latest version of the False Claims Act, as
amended in 1986, allows a whistleblower to recover even where she was not
the primary source of the information, although it does provide for a reduction
in the amount of the award to a maximum of 10 percent when the whistle-
blower has not been the primary source, provided the information had not
previously been made public. 51 However, where the Justice Department does
not intervene, there is no requirement that an award be discounted even
where the information provided by the whistleblower would already have been
available to government. This has precisely the salutary effect of not deterring
whistleblower actions where the government has deliberately decided not to
act on information independently available to it.
From an agency theory perspective, even where the government itself is
acting in the public interest, delegated decision-makers within government,
such as prosecuting attorneys or investigators, may have interests that are not
fully aligned with those of government. For example, where prosecutors are
not fully compensated for overtime, they may shirk from undertaking a case
that involves significant extra work unless they believe it offers them strong
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career advantages. Bureaucrats who want to leave open the possibility of a
private sector career upon leaving government may be disinclined to offend
major corporate interests. In the case of the defense sector, defense contractors
are a major source of employment for former government employees, as are
major government contractors generally. This consideration may weigh less on
Justice Department lawyers themselves and more on officials in the line
department that signed the government contract who would likely be consulted
on whether prosecution is warranted.51 A third factor is that there appears to
be some institutional bias against whistleblowers in the Justice Department,
which may explain why the Department frequently declines not only to
recommend that the Department join an action but often seeks to frustrate a
whistleblower's own recovery, arguing on various grounds that the whistle-
blower's reward should be reduced. As the Court pointedly noted in one
whistleblower's suit,
[n]o one likes snitches but they can be valuable. In view of their widespread
use, it is worthy of note that the Department of Justice has considered such
individuals as adversaries rather than allies. This is not the first case where
this Court has noted the antagonism of the Justice Department to a whistle-
blower. The reason continues to be unknown, but the attitude is clear. 13
On the basis of common explanations of bureaucratic conduct, a number
of reasons come to mind why Justice officials might have a bias against
whistleblowers despite the apparent social utility of their role. First, Justice
officials are themselves "team players" in a large organization and may be
distrustful of dissenters or apparent traitors within other large organizations.
Lennane (1993) suggests in a study of Australian whistleblowers that: "It is
disappointing that statutory authorities so often fail to help, seeming, like
most workmates, to side with employers as part of the authority system."54
Second, where whistleblowers pursue an action that the Justice Department
fails to join, they may in effect second-guess the judgement of Justice
Department officials in deciding not to prosecute. Finally, officials may react
out of jealousy or envy at the large awards that whistleblowers and/or their
lawyers may receive if successful.
CONCLUSIONS
THIS STUDY HAS EXPLORED THE SCOPE for whistleblowing to serve as animportant instrument in the arsenal of public policy designed to ensure
corporate compliance with broad social responsibilities. We believe that attention
to whistleblowing serves as a welcome addition to the debate over corporate
social responsibility. Traditionally, this debate has focused on issues of discre-
tionary directorial duties at the expense of dealing with more mundane but
significantly more important issues of corporate compliance. Whistleblowing
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holds considerable promise as an instrument capable of increasing the
probability of detection of perverse corporate behaviour, but at a relatively
low resource cost. In this respect, whistleblowing bounties are similar in
nature to other types of instruments that permit valuable corporate information
to be disseminated in a timely and accurate way to public authorities, and which
in turn enhance the quality of the regulatory system governing corporations.
While there are certainly vexing and subtle design issues involved in the
creation of workable whistleblowing schemes, we view these concerns as not
so formidable as to militate against the adoption of such schemes, and we
recommend them strongly to Canadian policy makers.
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